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UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS: A
STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
JUDICIAL POLICIES
JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER
Baltimore: Resources for the Future, 1986. Pp. 555. S37.50
Throughout the history of petroleum development there have been
recurring episodes in which the petroleum resources of the nation were
being wasted because the "rule-of-capture" which governed petroleum
development provided classic common property incentives to overdrill
and to remove the petroleum too rapidly. In response to obvious waste
each of the petroleum producing states has enacted "conservation statutes" that give a state agency considerable power to regulate petroleum
development in order to prevent the waste of a state's petroleum resources.
The result today is found to be a complex set of statutes and administrative
requirements that constrain petroleum development to be less wasteful
but which represent significant public sector involvement in specifying
the way in which petroleum resources will be developed and allocated.
Economists suggest that much of this regulatory apparatus could be removed and petroleum allowed to be developed primarily through the
voluntary market choices of oil producing enterprises if the majority of
oil and gas fields were to be developed through unitization. In other
words, if petroleum was developed in a fashion that treated each reservoir
as a single production uiit controlled by a single business enterprise rather
than by many distinct enterprises, the single unit operator would then
have the incentive to drill the number of wells and to choose a rate of
production that would be efficient.
Relatively early in the history of petroleum development some producers realized that unitization would be a valuable tool to protect the
resource from being developed wastefully as well as a means by which
their own individual interest in the resource could be protected from the
development activities of others. States were asked to consider allowing
voluntary unitization, and later to consider statutes that would provide
for compulsory unitization based upon the power of the state to enforce
unitization given some miniumum percentage (which varies across states)
of the mineral interests agreeing to a unitiation plan. To date all of the
petroleum producing states have passed compulsory unitization statutes
except Texas. Given the large part that Texas has in the total production
of petroleum in the United States the fact that Texas has no compulsory
unitization statute seems puzzling. The primary purpose of this book is
to discover an explanation for why Texas has not pfovided for compulsory
unitization.
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As preface to exploring this issue Chapter Two provides a clear and
very useful discussion of the physical characteristics of petroleum reservoirs, the engineering aspects of producing from the various types of
reservoirs, the economics of unitization, and the reasons voluntary unitization is often so difficult to achieve.
Chapters Three and Four examine the role of Texas legislature in the
developmemt of petroleum. Of specific interest is the apparent antipathy
the legislature held toward unitization during the early years of development, and which the legislature seems to hold to a lesser degree even
today. Much of the explanation for the legislature's disfavor with unitization is found in a concern with monopoly and its impact on the allocation
of petroleum resources. It is to be expected that the unit operator would
be one of the major oil producers and thus the concern that unitization
may result in monopoly or at least considerable market explanation is
found in the fact that the independent oil producer in Texas generally did
not support unitization because of the belief that unitization would result
in a decrease in the favored economic position that independents had in
the oil fields. Texas legislators tended to identify their own interests with
that of the independent oil producer and thus would tend not to support
unitization. Furthermore, the regulatory apparatus that had been constructed to prevent waste through prorationing and other devices seemed
to be successful in preventing the wasteful excesses of the rule of capture,
and this could be interpreted by the legislature as mitigating the need for
unitization.
The behavior of the Railroad Commission which regulates petroleum
development in Texas is examined in Chapter Five and Six. The discussion
in these chapters reveals the "'hidden law of unitization" in Texas. Although Texas statutes give the Railroad Commission the authority to
severely regulate petroleum development in order to prevent waste, the
statutes expressly forbid the Commission from using its authority to require unitization. Nonetheless, the Railroad Commission has used its
administrative power and discretion to encourage and even coerce oil and
gas producers to unitize. The primary tool it has used to accomplish
unitization is the individual field order by which the Railroad Commission
has shut down or severely curtailed the production from entire fields in
the name of preventing waste. These restrictions were clearly meant to
require unitization because it was understood that unitization was the only
way in which producers could satisfy the Commission's demand that they
curtail waste. The members of the Railroad Commission have never
publicly spoken of the Commission as having authority to compel unitization, and yet their decision-making activities were of sufficient strength
to establish as policy their efforts to accomplish unitization. The Coin-
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mission acknowledged the statutory prohibitions against requiring unitization, but they simply ignored it in practice.
Certainly the Railroad Commission's practice of using its authority to
restrict production in order to encourage and coerce unitization could not
have flaunted statutory prohibitions without help. The help came from
the courts. Chapter Seven reviews court decision-making and developments in the common law that either inhibit or facilitate voluntary unitization. Much of the common law inhibits unitization and actually
encourages overdrilling and ine fficient production. There is probably no
better example of this than the judge-made rule of capture. Of course
most of the common law contrary to unitization is common to all producing states, and such common law practices in Texas need not imply
that Texas courts were themselves hostile to unitization. In fact, Weaver
finds several cases which indicate a pro-unitization attitude held by the
Texas courts.
The court's review of Railroad Commission orders is examined in
Chapter Eight. Here Wever argues that there has been an effective partnership between the courts and the Railroad in efforts to prevent significant
waste. This partnership goes so far that the "court's silence regarding
.. the legislative prohibition against issuing waste-prevention orders
that would require repressuririg or unitization-was so deafening that
producers did not even attack the shutdown as illegal on this ground."
Although Texas has no compulsory unitization statute Weaver has shown
considerble evidence that through the decision-making of the Railroad
Commission and the courts there has been an effective policy of compulsory unitization in Texas. In Chapter Nine Weaver examines the extent
of unitization in Texas with the aid of several statistical comparisons.
The bottom line is that there has in fact been significiant unitization in
Texas, enough so that Texas appears to have accomplished more unitization than Oklahoma, but not so much as has Louisiana (both states
have compulsory unitization). There are also many significant fields not
yet unitized in Texas. Perhaps it is important not just to examine the
unitization that has occurred, but to also attempt an evaluation of how
much more unitization is needed in Texas. Chapter Ten offers Weaver's
assessment that a compulsory unitization statute is still needed in Texas,
and given some skepticism that such a statute will be passed a number
of statutory reforms are also suggested.
There is certainly additional analysis and legal history to be found in
this work of 555 pages that simply cannot be mentioned in a review. This
is important research that should be of interest to both economists and
legal scholars. As an economist I cannot judge the quality of the legal
scholarship, but there is considerable economic analysis which is com-
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petently done. I found the book interesting, informative, and well written,
although I must confess that it was sometimes difficult for this economist
to keep all the legal details straight. One recognizes in reading this book,
the vast complexity that can surround production and economic relationships that simply is missed by the economist's account of the market as
a demand and supply cross.
Larry S. Eubanks
Assistant Professor of Economics
and Public Administration
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

